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-Torts--R.idroads" Liability at Dangerous Highway.Crossing-Statutory Construction of That Duty.
In Southern Ry. v,.>Aker'Motor Lities, Inc.' the Stipreh1d Court
6f North Carolina; byits interpretation of a stattite, in effect abolished
'the common-law duty of a railroad to erect, after due notice, any type
of warning device or-signal 'at',dangerous grade crossings. In Akers
plaintiff railways6ught damages arising ott of a collision between
Thabe
Ufs train and the deehdant's tractor-trailer. It based its claim oil the
alleged .neglignce of tfie truck driver' in failing to keep a proper
lookout when approaching a grade crossing. The defendant motor
lines filed a cross- action against the plaintiff, basing its claim on the
failure of the-'railroad to maintain"gates, gongs or other such safety
devices at the crossing which the railroad should have known was
'dangerous. 'With rdspect to the cross action, the judge instructed
:the jury as to the defendant's contention of negligence on the part
of the railroad in failing to maifitain warning devices at the crossing.
,On appeal,'the court held it was error to so charge, because the'trial
court had failed to take notice of the provisions of G.S. § 136720.2
The court stated that by the enactment of this statute, the legislature
'has taken from the railroads all authority and duty to erect safety
devices at 'railroad crossings, 'and has vested in the State Highway
.Commissioni "excltisive 'discretionary authority... to determine when
"and under what conditions such signalling devices are to be erected
'and maintained by railroad companies." 8
The statute involved, G.S. § 136-20, is a comprehensive statute
'dealing with the safeguarding, and in some cases the elimination, of
grade crossings. In essence, this statute.provides that where a rail-road and a public highway intersect, the Highway' Commission, if
it feels such crossing is dangerous to the public, has authority to order
the railroad to alter the crossing in such a way as to eliminate any
dingerbus conditions.' The costs of such changes are to 'be apporthe doctrine of tort immunity of charitable institutions seems to best represent
the rationale of courts that have abolished outmoded common law principles:
"We have closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and we can
likevise 'open them." Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43
Wash. 162, 178, 260 P.2d 765, 774 (1953).
... 242 N.C. 676, 89 S.E.2d 392 (1955).
".N.C.GEN. STAFF. § 136-20 ('Supp. 1961),
8242 N.C.at 680, 89 S.E.2d at 394-95. The court admits that this statute
woiks a radical change in the law.
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tioned as the Commission may determine. Subsection (f) provides:
"The jurisdiction over and control of said grade crossings and safety
devices upon -the State highway system herein given the Commission
shall be exclusive." 4 This subsection was the primary basis for the
Akers decision. The court interpreted it as taking away all authority
of a railroad to erect safety devices at crossings on their own initiative, thereby, in effect, doing away with the common-law duty to
maintain necessary safety devices.
G.S. § 136-20 is not a unique statute. There are many other
states which have similar, and in some instances almost identical,
statutes.
A Minnesota statute, comparable to G.S. § 136-20, also exclusively authorizes the Highway Commission to designate what
safety devices are needed at crossings, and to order the railroad to
install them. 5 Minnesota was faced with almost the identical problem
in Licha v. Northern Pac. Ry.' that the North Carolina court encountered in Akers. In a previous case the court had concluded that
their statute was comprehensive and dealt with the entire matter of
safety devices at railroad crossings, thus indicating the legislative
intent "to occupy the entire field." 7 This decision waB overruled by
the Licha decision.' In Licha, the plaintiff collided with a train while
proceeding across the defendant railway's tracks which, due to the
terrain, was a blind crossing. The railroad had complied with the
Commission's requirements as to the necessary signs at the crossing;
however, the plaintiff alleged that the reflector signs so provided in
compliance with the order of the Commission were insufficient, and
that the defendant should have placed some other type of warning
device commensurate with conditions at the crossing. The railroad
took the position that by installing the reflector signs in compliance
with the Commission's order, it was absolved of any further duty
to give additional warning. In rejecting the railroad's contention,
the court recognized its error in the earlier case of Olson v. Chicago,
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-20(f) (Supp. 1961).
8 15 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 219.24 (1947): "When.

..

the commission finds

that conditions exist at any grade crossing which in its opinion require any
safeguards for the protection of life and property, such as crossing gates or
other suitable devices, the commission is authorized to specify the nature
of the devices required and to order the railway company operating the railroad at such crossing to install the same."
8201 Minn. 427, 276 N.W. 813 (1937).
"Olson v. Chicago, Great W. Ry., 193 Minn. 533, 259 N.W. 70 (1935).
'201 Minn. at 439, 276 N.W. at 819.
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Great W. Ry.' and consequently overruled that prior decision.
The court thus held that the exclusive authority of the Commission,
given by the statute, to order a railroad to comply should be deemed
to be a revocation of a similar authority previously given to municipalities.'0 Thus a railroad must take such precautions in management and operation as public safety requires, even though such precautions may be in addition to those required by statute or order of
the Commission. Compliance with the Commission's order was
regarded as only the minimum duty of the railroad.'1
Similarly, Connecticut has a statute, closely paralleling G.S.
§ 136-20, which gives the Commission power to order warning
devices to be installed at railroad crossings which the Commission
deems .dangerous.2 In Pratt, Read & Co. v. New York, N.H.
& H.R.R. 3 the Connecticut court was called upon to determine the
effect of the statute. There, the defendant railroad had complied
with all the statutes requiring warning signs at railroad crossings.
While the statute in question gave the Commission power to order
additional automatic signals to be installed, no such order had been
given. The plaintiff, who was injured at a blind crossing, alleged
that the railroad had a duty to provide additional warning devices
even though it had not been so ordered by the Commission. The
trial court charged the jury that the railroad was not guilty of
negligence as a matter of law for not providing such devices, because
the legislature had assumed the regulation of such installation and
could order such installation when it deemed it necessary. On appeal,
the Connecticut Supreme Court held the instruction erroneous. The
court said that merely because those to whom the legislature has
delegated the authority of ordering installation of warning devices
' 193 Minn. 533, 259 N.W. 70 (1935).
10 201 Minn. at 435, 276 N.W. at 817. Prior to the Minnesota statute, the

legislature had authorized municipalities to order railroads to ameliorate

dangerous crossings; the court construed the new statute as a revocation of
such municipal power, vesting such power exclusively in the Commission.
11 Id. at 435, 276
N.W. at 817; Blaske v. Northern Pac. Ry., 228 Minn.
444, 37 N.W.2d 758 (1949); Koop v. Great No. Ry., 224 Minn. 286, 28
N.W.2d 687 (1947) ; Massmann v. Great No. Ry., 224 Minn. 170, 282 N.W.
815 (1938); Munkel v. Chicago, M., St. P. R.R., 202 Minn. 306, 278 N.W.
41 (1938).
11 3 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 16-159 (1958): "If the Commission upon such
hearing finds that public safety requires it, the Commission shall order such
company to install and maintain, at such crossings, gates, a flagman or such
electric signals or other signal device as may be approved by the commission ....
1 102 Conn. 735, 130 Atl. 102 (1925).
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at crossings have failed to so order, no presumption can arise, as a
matter of law, that reasonable care on the part of the railroad would
not require such protection. It is still a question of fact for the jury
as to whether or not it was the duty of the railroad to have provided
14
any safeguard.
A parallel Arizona statute gives the Commission the same powers
as conferred upon the North Carolina State Highway Commission by
G.S. § 136-20.1 This statute was considered by the Arizona court
in Canion v. Southern Pac. Co.'
In that case the plaintiff
was driving his truck over the defendant's tracks, following another
truck. The lead truck raised so much dust that the plaintiff was
unable to see the approaching train. A collision resulted, and the
plaintiff sued for damages. As one of the alleged grounds of negligence, the plaintiff contended that the defendant railway failed to
maintain a watchman or automatic safety signal at the crossing.
The defendant relied upon the absence of an order of the Commission
to install any safety device, contending that such absence absolved it
from any negligence on that theory as a matter of law. As in the
Licha and Pratt cases, the court rejected this contention, holding
that the railroad might still be liable on a theory of negligence in not
installing safety devices, even if not ordered to do so by the Commission, if reasonable care would require such warning to be maintained.
If any one conclusion can be deduced from this investigation, it
is that no other jurisdiction now regards a statute such as G.S.
§ 136-20 as abolishing the common-law duty of a railroad at
dangerous crossings to use due care toward the travelling public.
It appears that North Carolina stands alone in its novel interpretation of the statute as propounded in the Akers case.
Without any evidence of the intention of the legislature in regard
to this common-law duty in enacting G.S. § 136-20, two possibilities
exist: (1) that the legislature did in fact intend to take from the
" Id. at 751, 130 AUt. at 107; Trombly v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
137 Conn. 465, 78 A.2d 689 (1951); Markar v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
77 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1935).
" 12 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 40-337 (C) (1956): "The commission shall have
the exclusive power to prescribe the character of crossings to be constructed
and maintained by railroads where their lines cross public roads or streets
of a town or city."
52 Ariz. 245, 80 P.2d 397 (1938).
11Id. at 253, 80 P.2d at 401;
Southern Pac. R.R. v. Mitchell, 80 Ariz. 50,
292 P.2d 827 (1956).
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railroads all duty and authority to erect safety devices at crossings,
vesting such duty and authority exclusively in the Highway Commission; or, (2) that the legislature never intended to delimit the
railroads' common-law duties with regard to dangerous crossings,
and that the court in Akers misinterpreted G.S. § 136-20.
The North Carolina statute is almost identical to statutes of
numerous other states. In not one of those states has it been interpreted as an intention on the part of the legislature to absolve a railroad of any of its common-law duties. The possibility that North
Carolina, by the enactment of so similar a statute, intended to exempt
railroads from any common-law duty is, therefore, remote.
If the legislature never intended to abolish the railroads' commonlaw duties at dangerous crossings, it follows that the North Carolina
Supreme Court misinterpreted G.S. § 136-20, and that the rule laid
down in the Akers decision is erroneous. In particular, the court
construed subsection (f) as vesting exclusive authority in the Highway Commission to determine when and where safety devices are to
be constructed, thus relieving the railroad of all authority to erect
such devices on their own. Apparently the words "herein given the
Commission" were forgotten by the court when it interpreted subsection (f). These words would seem to delegate to the Commission
the sole authority to order construction, reparation, and maintenance
of facilities at grade crossings, to the exclusion of like authority
being exercised by municipalities, counties, or other state agencies.18
The only agency authorized to exercise the powers "herein given the
Commission" is the Highway Commission itself, the only purpose of
subsection (f) being to delegate to a single agency the power to
order the railroad to erect such safety devices if it deems such action
-necessary for the protection of the public. If this is the correct inter:pretation of G.S. § 136-20, it should not in any way be construed as
-a bar to a railroad's erecting its own safety devices or an abolition of
-the railroad's common-law duties to the public.
The Akers decision is the only occasion in which the court has
had to apply its interpretation of G.S. § 136-20. The apparent result
of the decision is to leave the injured plaintiff with no recourse
"8Prior to the enactment of G.S. § 136-20, such authority was frequently
exercised in North Carolina by municipalities through powers given in their
charters and by ordinances. See City of Durham v. Southern Ry., 185 N.C.
240, 177 S.E. 17 (1924) ; Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 155

N.C. 356, 71 S.E. 514 (1914).
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against-the railroad when the sole basis of his action is failure of the
railroad to provide safety devices which have not been prescribed by
the Highway Commission. Such a result appears to be entirely inconsistent with the rule laid down in other states which have similar
statutes. 19
If the legislature did not intend to abolish the railroads' commonlaw duties to erect safety devices at dangerous crossings, the best
possible remedy to the problem would be an amendment to G.S.
§ 136-20 by the legislature. It should specify that nothing in G.S.
§ 136-20 should be construed to absolve a railroad from any commonlaw duty to the public, whether or not any action has been taken
by the Highway Commission under the powers granted by G.S.
§ 136-20.
-

ARcH K. ScftOcH IV

Torts-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Doctrine of Exclusive Control
of the Instrumentality
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence applied
where, under the circumstances of the case, the mere fact that the
accident occurred is of itself circumstantial evidence of negligence on
the part of someone.1 In application of the doctrine to actual fact
situations the courts have developed certain "elements" which might
be termed conditions precedent to its invocation. These elements
1
57 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1202, Pennington v. Southern Pac. Co., 146
Cal. App. 2d 605, 304 P.2d 22 (1956); Jenson v. Southern Pac. Co., 129 Cal.
App. 2d 67, 276 P.2d 703 (1954) ; Lloyd v. Southern Pac. Co., 111 Cal. App.
2d 626, 245 P.2d 583 (1952); ILL. ANN. STAT. 111% § 62 (1954), Baltimore
& O.R.R. v. Felgenhauer, 168 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1948); Bales v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 347 Ill. App. 466, 107 N.E.2d 179 (1952); Lauer v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry.,
305 Ill. App. 200, 27 N.E.2d 315 (1940) ; Willett v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R.,
284 Ill. App. 307, 1 N.E.2d 748 (1936); Wagner v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 352
Ill. 85, 185 N.E. 236 (1933); 5 Mass. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 160, § 147
(1959), Peterson v. Boston & M.R.R., 310 Mass. 45, 36 N.E.2d 701 (1941) ;
Mannino v. Boston & M.R.R., 300 Mass. 71, 14 N.E.2d 122 (1938) ; Hubbard
v. Boston & A.R.R., 162 Mass. 132, 38 N.E.2d 366 (1894); 49 Orio REv.
CODE ANN. § 4907.47 (Supp. 1961), Evans v. Erie R.R., 213 Fed. 129 (6th
Cir. 1914) ; 17 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 84 (1951), Slowik v. Chicago, M., St. P.
& Pac. R.R., 89 F. Supp. 590 (D. Minn. 1950); Kansas City So. Ry. v. State,
195 Okl. 424, 158 P.2d 699 (1945); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Prince, 145 Old.
194, 291 Pac. 973 (1930).
1The Latin phrase "res ipsa loquitur" means "the thing speaks for itself."
It was first used in Byrne v. Boadle, 2 Hurl. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299
(Exch. 1863), although the idea that negligence could be proven by circumstantial evidence had existed prior to that time. PRossER, TORTS § 42, at 201

(2d ed. 1955).

